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Abstract—Artifact-centric workflows describe possible execu-
tions of a business process through constraints expressed from
the point of view of the documents exchanged between principals.
A sequence of manipulations is deemed valid as long as every
document in the workflow follows its prescribed lifecycle at all
steps of the process. So far, establishing that a given workflow
complies with artifact lifecycles has mostly been done through
static verification, or by assuming a centralized access to all
artifacts where these constraints can be monitored and enforced.
We present in this paper an alternate method of enforcing
document lifecycles that requires neither static verification nor
single-point access. Rather, the document itself is designed to
carry fragments of its history, protected from tampering using
hashing and public-key encryption. Any principal involved in the
process can verify at any time that a document’s history complies
with a given lifecycle. Moreover, the proposed system also enforces
access permissions: not all actions are visible to all principals, and
one can only modify and verify what one is allowed to observe.
I. INTRODUCTION
The execution of a business process is often materialized
by the successive manipulation of a document passing from
one agent to the next. However, the document may have
constraints on the way it is modified, and by whom: we
call this the lifecycle of a document. In the past decade,
artifact-centric business processes have been suggested as a
modelling paradigm where business process workflows are
expressed solely in terms of document constraints: a sequence
of manipulations is deemed valid as long as every document (or
“artifact”) in the workflow follows its own prescribed lifecycle
at all steps of the process. In this context, an artifact becomes
a stateful object, with a finite-state machine-like expression
of its possible modifications. As we shall see in Section II,
this paradigm can be applied to a variety of situations, ranging
from medical document processing to accounting and even
electronic-pass systems such as smart cards.
Central to the question of business processes execution is
the concept of compliance checking, or the verification, through
various means, that a given implementation of a business
process satisfies the constraints associated with it. Transposed to
artifact-centric business processes, this entails one must provide
some guarantee that the lifecycle of each artifact involved is
respected at all times.
There are currently two main approaches to the enforcement
of this lifecycle, which will be detailed in Section III. A first
possibility is that all the peers involved in the manipulations
trust each other and assume they perform only valid manipula-
tions of the document; this trust can be assessed through testing
or static verification of the peer’s implementation. Otherwise,
all peers can trust a third party, through which all accesses to
the document need to be done; this third-party is responsible
for enforcing the document’s lifecycle, and must prevent invalid
modifications from taking place. The reader shall note that both
scenarios require some form of external trust, which becomes an
entry point for attacks. In the first scenario, a single malicious
user can thwart the enforcement of the lifecycle and invalidate
any guarantees the other peers can have with respect to it. In
the second scenario, reliance on a third party opens the way to
classical mistrust-based attacks, such as man-in-the-middle.
In this paper, we present a mechanism for the distributed
enforcement of a document’s lifecycle, in which every peer
can individually check that the lifecycle of a document it is
being passed is correctly followed. This system, presented in
Section IV, requires neither centralized access to the document,
nor trust in other peers that are allowed to manipulate it.
Rather, the document itself is designed to carry fragments
of its history, called a peer-action sequence. This sequence is
protected from tampering through careful use of hashing and
public-key encryption. Using this system, any peer involved in
the business process can verify at any time that a document’s
history complies with a given lifecycle, expressed as a finite-
state automaton. Moreover, the proposed system also enforces
access permissions: not all actions are visible to all principals,
and one can only modify and verify what one is allowed to
observe.
To illustrate the concept, Section V describes an implemen-
tation of these principles in a simple command-line tool that
manipulates dynamic PDF forms. Peer-action sequences are
injected through a hidden field into a PDF file, and updated
every time the form is modified through the tool. As a result,
it is possible to retrieve the document’s modification history
at any moment, verify its authenticity using a public keyring,
and check that it complies with a given policy.
The section concludes with a few discussion points. In
particular, it highlights the fact that, using peer-action sequences,
the compliance of a document with a given lifecycle specifi-
cation can easily be checked. Taken to the extreme, lifecycle
policies can even be verified without resorting to any workflow
management system at all: as long as documents are properly
stamped by every peer participating in the workflow, the precise
way they are exchanged (e-mail, file copying, etc.) becomes
irrelevant. This presents the potential of greatly simplifying
the implementation of artifact-centric workflows, by dropping
many assumptions that must be fulfilled by current systems.
II. DOCUMENT LIFECYCLES
We shall now describe a number of distinct scenarios, taken
from past literature, that can be modelled as sets of constraints
over the lifecycle of some document. In the following, the
term document will encompass any physical or logical entity
carrying data and being passed on to undergo modifications.
This can represent either a physical memory card, a paper
or electronic form, or more generally, any object commonly
labelled as an “artifact” in some circles.
A special case of “lifecycle” is one where conditions apply
on snapshots of documents taken individually, irrespective of
their relation with previous of subsequent versions of this
document. For example, the lifecycle could simply express
conditions on what values various elements of a document can
take, and be likened to integrity constraints. However, in the
following, we are more interested in lifecycles that also involve
the sequence of states in which the document is allowed to move
through, and the identity of the effectors of each modification.
A. Medical Document Processing
As a first example, we consider a medical health care
process, introduced by Bielova et al. [7] and illustrated
in Figure 1. Medical data is inherently sensitive and the
inappropriate manipulations of medical document can have
far-reaching implications. As a consequence, medical processes
are subject to rigid controls, documented in standards. Figure 1
models one such process, namely medication dispensation. The
information related to medication dispensation is recorded in a
file F, which allows doctors to track the medications of their
patients, drug-trial administrators to monitor the occurrence of
side-effects and hospitals to get reimbursements from the states
for the drugs they administer.
As described in [6], the expected sequence of manipulation
proceeds as follows:
1) First, a doctor selects a drug.
2) Depending on the drug, the doctor may be obligated to
review therapeutic notes before proceeding further.
3) If the drug is part of an ongoing trial, the doctor must
record the trial protocol in the prescription.
4) The doctor inputs any other relevant detail in the prescrip-
tion.
5) The availability of the drug in the stock is checked.
6) If the drug is unavailable in the stock, its availability in
the ward is checked.
7) If the drug was available, either in the stock or in the
ward, the process is complete, otherwise, the doctor must
select an alternative drug.
This process was designed to ensure compliance with the
standards and regulation in place in the Italian region of
Lombardia [6].
B. Accounting Processes
Another context in which the sequencing of document
manipulations is particularly sensitive is banking. In this case,
restriction on the workflow of document manipulations ensures
that the proper banking laws and regulations as well as with
the proper precautions that ensure the prudent management of
money.
Rao et al. recently [26] studied banking document workflow
and proposed a novel formalism for stating the restrictions
governing document workflows. Their formalism, the Process
Matrix, is strictly more expressive than BPMN as it allows users
to place conditional restrictions on the obligation to perform
certain steps.
Figure 2 shows the running example used in [26], a loan
application process. Each row of the figure represents an activity
of the process, listed in the first column. The next three column
indicate the access rights for each of the three roles (applicant,
case worker and manager) that a principal can possess in this
process. For instance, the applicant can write-out an application,
which can then be read by both the case worker and the manager,
but only the manager can apply the second approval to a
demand for a loan. The next column lists the constraints on
the sequencing between activities. It distinguishes between
regular predecessor, with their usual meaning, and logical
predecessor, indicated with an asterisk (*). If activity A is
a logical predecessor to activity B, then anytime activity A
is re-executed, activity B must also be re-executed. The final
column describes optional Boolean activity conditions that may
render an an activity superfluous. In our example, the second
approval can be omitted if the predicate Rich holds.
C. Data Integrity Policies
The scheme under consideration could also be useful in
regards to the enforcement of several classes of Data Integrity
policies. All of them can be stated as finite automata [15].
Assured pipelines [8] facilitate the secure transfer of
sensitive information over trust boundaries by specifying which
data transformation must occur before any other data processing.
For instance, assured pipelines can be specified to ensure
that confidential data is anonymized before being publicly
disseminated, or that user inputs be formatted before being
inputted into a system.
A Chinese Wall policy [9] can put in place to prevent
conflicts of interest from occurring. For instance, a Chinese
wall policy can be set up to prevent a consultant from advising
two competing firms, or an investor from suggesting placements
in a company in which he holds interest.
«««< HEAD Sobel et al. propose a trace-based enforcement
model of the Chinese wall policy, enriched with useful notions
of data-relinquishing and time-frames, for which the data
management scheme proposed in this paper is suited [30].
In their framework, each object o is associated with a list of
action-principal pairs, sequentially listing the actions (either
create or read) each principal performed on the object. On a
well-formed object, the list begins with a single create event,
followed by a series of reads. The policy is stated as a set of
conflicts of interests C ∈ P(O). Each object Oi is associated
with its conflict of interest Ci, that lists the other objects that
conflicts with it. The enforcement of the Chinese wall policy
is ensured by preventing any user who has accessed a object
in set Ci from accessing object Oi.
Finally, the low-water-mark policy was designed by Biba
[5] to capture the constraints that ensure data integrity. In this
model, each subject, and each data object, is mapped to a
integrity level indicating its trustworthiness. A subject can only
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Figure 1: BPMN model drug dispensation process, from Bielova et al. [6]
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Figure 2: Process Matrix for a loan application, from [26]
write to objects that are equal or below its integrity level, and
can only read object that are higher or equal of its own integrity
level. This prevents subjects and objects from being tainted
with unreliable (low-integrity) data.
D. Other Examples
Smart cards, such as MIFARE Classic1, are used to grant
access to public transit. They record the number of access
tokens their carriers currently holds, as well as a trace of his
previous journeys in the system. The card is edited by a card
reader.
In this case, the source of mistrust is not the readers, but
the carrier of the card. For example, one does not wish the
same card to enter twice from the same station, which would
likely indicate an attempt at using the same card to get two
people in. This is an example of a lifecycle property of the
card. The information contained in the MIFARE card could
also be used to allow or disallow transfers from one public
1http://www.mifare.net
transit route to another, with any applicable restriction captured
in the lifecycle policy.
Similar cards are used in several contexts including library
cards, hotel key cards, membership cards, Social welfare, car
rentals and access to amusement parks or museums.
III. ENFORCING DOCUMENT LIFECYCLES
In the Business Process community, constraints on document
lifecycles have been studied in the context of “object behaviour
models”. The most prominent form of such model is artifact-
centric business process modelling [4], [22], [23], [28], [31].
In this context, various documents (called “artifacts”) can be
passed from one peer to the next and be manipulated. Rather
than (or in addition to) expressing constraints on how each
peer can execute, the business process is defined in terms
of the lifecycle of the artifacts involved: any sequence of
manipulations that complies with the lifecycle of each artifact
is a valid execution of the process.
The specification of document lifecycles can be done in
various ways. For example, the Business Entity Definition
Language (BEDL) [27] allows the specification of lifecycles
to business entities as finite state machines. Another possible
way of modelling the lifecycle of these artifacts is the Guard-
Stage-Milestone (GSM) paradigm [22], which identifies four
key elements: an information model for artifacts; milestones
which correspond to business-relevant operational objectives;
stages, which correspond to clusters of activity intended to
achieve milestones; and finally guards, which control when
stages are activated. Both milestones and guards are controlled
in a declarative manner, based on triggering events and/or
conditions. Other approaches include BPMN with data [25]
and PHILharmonic flows [24].
While the specification of artifact lifecycles is relatively
well understood, the question of enforcing a lifecycle specified
in some way has been the subject of many works, which can
be categorized as follows.
A. Centralized Workflow Approaches
Many works on that topic rely on the fact that the artifacts
will be manipulated through a workflow engine. Therefore, the
functionalities required to enforce lifecycle constraints can be
implemented directly at this central location, since all read/write
accesses to the documents must be done through the system.
This is the case, for example, of work done by Zhao et al. [32].
Similar work has been done on the database front: Atullah
and Tompa propose a technique to convert business policies
expressed as finite-state machines into database triggers [2].
Their work is based on a model of a business process where any
modification to a business object ultimately amounts to one or
many transactions executed on a (central) database; constraints
on the lifecycle of these objects can hence be enforced as
carefully written INSERT or UPDATE database triggers.
In contrast, the work we present in this paper does not
require any centralized access to the artifacts being manipulated.
B. Static Verification
In other cases, knowledge of the workflow makes it possible
to statically analyze it and make sure that all declarative
lifecycle constraints are respected at all times [4], [10], [16],
[20], [21], [32]. For example, Gonzalez et al. propose a way
of symbolically representing GSM-based business artifacts, in
such a way that model checking can be done on the resulting
model [17].
However, verification is in general a much harder problem
than preventing invalid behaviours from occurring at runtime;
therefore, severe restrictions must imposed on the properties that
can be expressed, or the underlying complexity of the execution
environment, in order to ensure the problem is tractable (or
even decidable). For example, [10] considers an artifact model
with arithmetic operations, no database, and runs of bounded
length. [4], [16] impose that domains of data elements be
bounded, or that pre- and post-conditions refer only to the
artifacts, and not their variable values [16]. As a matter of fact,
just determining when the verification problem is decidable
has become a research topic in its own right. For example,
Calvanese et al. identify sufficient conditions under which a
UML-based methodology for modelling artifact-centric business
processes can be verified [11].
Furthermore, in a setting where verification is employed,
one must trust that each peer involved in the process has been
statically verified, and also that the running process is indeed
the one that was verified in the first place. This hypothesis
in itself can prove hard to fulfill in practice, especially in the
case of business processes spanning multiple organizations. In
contrast, the proposed work eschews any trust assumptions by
allowing any peer manipulating an artifact to verify by itself that
any lifecycle constraint has indeed been followed by everyone.
Moreover, since lifecycle violations are checked at the time
of execution (a simpler problem than static verification), our
approach can potentially use very rich behaviour specification
languages.
C. Decentralized Workflow Approaches
The correctness of the sequence of operations can also be
checked at runtime, as the operations are being executed; this
was attempted by one of the authors in past work [19]. This
concept has also been suggested, e.g. for the enforcement of
lifecycle constraints on RFID tags passing from one reader to
the next [29].
It is also possible to reuse notions found in Decentralized
Runtime Monitoring [3], [12]. Runtime monitoring consists in
checking whether a run of a given system verifies the formal
specification of the system. In this case, the lifecycle is the
specification, and the sequence of modifications to the document
is the trace to be verified. Decentralized runtime monitoring
is designed with the goal to monitor decentralized systems,
it is therefore possible to monitor decentralized changes to a
document. The approach performs monitoring by progressing
LTL —that is, starting with the LTL specification, the monitor
rewrites the formula to account for the new modifications.
However, at the cost of offering full decentralization, LTL
progression could increase the size of the formula significantly
as the sequence of actions grows. The growth rate poses a
challenge to store the new formula in the document when
storage space is small and sequence lengths are large. It is
however possible to reduce the overhead significantly by using
an automata-based approach [13], at the cost of communicating
more between the various components in the decentralized
system. This approach could be suitable for a specific type of
lifecycles where interaction is frequent between the various
parties.
In a similar way, in cooperative runtime monitoring (CRM)
[18], a recipient “delegates” its monitoring task to the sender,
which is required to provide evidence that the message it
sends complies with the contract. In turn, this evidence can be
quickly checked by the recipient, which is then guaranteed
of the sender’s compliance to the contract without doing
the monitoring computation by itself. This differs from the
approach presented in this paper in many respects. First,
cooperative runtime monitoring expects the properties to be
known in advance, and to belong to the NP complexity class;
our proposed approach is independent from the lifecycle
specification. Second, and most importantly, CRM does not
protect the tokens exchanged between a client and a server; a
request can be replaced by another, through a man-in-the-
middle attack, and be accepted by the server so long as
it is a valid continuation of the current message exchange.
Finally, the approach is restricted to a single two-point, one-
way communication link.
D. Cryptographic Approaches
Finally, some related works can also be found based on
security and cryptography. In this context, work on “lifecycle”
enforcement has mostly focused on preventing the mediator of
the document (for example, the owner of a metro card) from
tampering with its contents. Therefore, a common approach is
to encrypt the document’s content, using an encryption scheme
where keys are shared between peers but are unknown to
the mediator. This approach works in a context where peers
do not trust the mediator, but do trust each other. Therefore,
compromising a single peer (for example, by stealing its key)
can compromise the whole exchange. In contrast, our proposed
technique provides tighter containment in case one of the peers
is compromised. For example, stealing the private key of one of
the peers cannot be exploited to force violations of the lifecycle,
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Figure 3: Lifecycle Enforcement
if the remaining peers still check for lifecycle violations and
deny further processing to a document that contains one. As
a matter of fact, we have seen how the peer-action sequence,
secured by its digest, can in such a case be used to identify
the peer responsible for this deviation of the lifecycle.
IV. LIFECYCLE ENFORCEMENT WITH PEER-ACTION
SEQUENCES
To alleviate the issues mentioned above, we describe in
this section an original technique for storing a history of
modifications directly into a document. Given guarantees on
the authenticity of this history (which will be provided through
the use of hashing and encryption), this technique allows any
peer to retrieve a document, check its history and verify that it
follows a lifecycle specification at any time.
In the following, we assume the existence of public
key encryption/decryption functions; the notation E[M,K]
designates the result of encrypting message M with key K,
while D[M,K] corresponds to decryption. We also suppose
the existence of a hash function h¯, and assume to simplify
notation that its set of output values is H. We fix P to be the
set of peers; each peer p ∈ P possesses a pair of public/private
encryption keys noted Kp,u, Kp,v, respectively. Peers belong to
one or more access groups. The set of groups is G and consists
of labels identifying each group. Groups are akin to the notion
of role in classical access-control models such as RBAC [14]:
we shall see that belonging to a group gives read/write access
to a number of fields of the document under consideration.
Figure 3 illustrates our general approach to enforcing
lifecycles. First we begin by defining the lifecycle δ , then
show how a sequence can be encrypted to hide information
from various groups, and how its digest is computed to ensure
its integrity. Moreover, we explain how the sequence can be
verified given its digest, then decrypted and verified by every
peer p based on their permissions (δp).
A. Document Lifecycles
Let D be a set of documents, A be a set of actions; each
action a ∈ A is associated with a function fa : D→ D taking a
document as an input, and returning another document as its
output. A special document, noted d /0, will be called the empty
document. Although not necessarily “empty”, it represents the
initial state in which all documents start prior to being modified
by any peer. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that d /0 is
unique in D.
A peer-action is a 4-tuple 〈a, p,g,h〉 ∈ (A× P×G×H)
consisting of an action a, identifying the peer responsible for
this action p and identifying on behalf of which group g was
the action taken (the purpose of the hash h will be explained
later). We construct a sequence of peer-actions and denote it
by s. The set S contains all possible peer-action sequences, for
given sets P, A, G and H.
A document lifecycle specifies what actions peers are
allowed to make on a document and in which order. It is
represented by a function δ : S → {>,⊥}. Intuitively, the
function δ takes as input a peer-action sequence, and decides
whether this sequence is valid (>) or not (⊥).
As an example, let us consider the simple case of a metro
card. In this case, P is the set of all metro stations and
buses. D = {d /0}: the card does not carry any information,
apart from metadata related to its history. The set of actions
A is made of two actions a↓, and a↑, representing a user
going in and out, respectively. We only define one group
G = {pub}. The lifecycle function δ can then be defined
as δ (〈(p1,a1,g1,h1), . . . ,(pn,an,gn,hn)〉) = ⊥ if and only if
there exists an i such that pi = pi+1 and ai = ai+1 = a↓. This
corresponds to the case where two successive “in” actions occur
at the same station.
We decentralize the specification by incorporating different
groups. For each group g ∈ G we consider a symmetric key
Sg, we associate the group lifecycle function δg and we assign
peers to groups using the predicate M(p,g) indicating the peer
p belongs to group g. δg specifies the actions allowed for a
member of the group to make on the document. Therefore, a
peer p∈P belongs to the set of groups Gp = {g |M(p,g) =>}.
The lifecycle that p will verify is δp(s) : S→ {>,⊥}, with
δp(s) =
∧
g∈Gp(δg(s)), where > and ⊥ are interpreted as
Boolean true and false respectively. The lifecycle δp ensures
that p can only verify the lifecycles of groups they belong to.
We add the restriction that when a peer executes an action on
a document, they execute it on behalf of one group only. We
note that in this case, that a group lifecycle δg acts on the
entire sequence. Therefore, the specification must be written
in a way that δg is only concerned with the actions relevant
to the group, ignoring the rest of the sequence and handling
synchronization.
B. Encrypting a Sequence
Before storing the peer-action sequence in the document, we
ensure confidentiality for group actions. For the scope of this
paper, we seek to disallow non-group members to see which
exact action has been taken, but not the fact that an action has
been taken. A peer action 〈a, p,g,h〉 where peer p has taken
an action a on behalf of g is encrypted as
〈
E[a,Sg], p,g,h
〉
.
The actual peer-action sequence stored in the document is
s∗ : (P×H×G×H)∗. This ensures that members outside the
group can see that the peer p has taken an action on behalf of
the group g (thus are able to check M(p,g)), but cannot see
which action (a) has been taken. Therefore they cannot know
which fa has been applied to the document.
C. Computing a Digest
The enforcement of a lifecycle is done by calculating and
manipulating an history digest.
Definition 1 (Digest): Let s∗ = (pa∗1, . . . pa
∗
n) be an en-
crypted peer-action sequence of length n, and let s′∗ =
(pa∗1, . . . , pa
∗
n−1) be the same sequence, trimmed of its last
peer-action pair, where pa∗i = 〈a∗i , pi,gi,hi〉 for i ∈ [0,n]. The
digest of s∗, noted ∇(s∗), is defined as follows:
∇(s∗),
{
0 if n = 0
E[h¯(∇(s′∗) ·a∗n ·gn),Kv,pn ] otherwise
In other words, to compute the n-th digest of a given
encrypted sequence s, the peer pn responsible for the last action
an on behalf of the group g takes the last computed digest,
encrypts an with the group key Sg, concatenates E[an,Sg] ·g,
computes its hash, and encrypts the resulting string using its
private key Kv,pn . The use of the hash function ensures that
the content to be encrypted is of constant length, and does not
expand as new actions are appended to the document’s history.
Signing with the group id appended to the action is used to
ensure the integrity of the group advertised. We note that when
adding a new element to the encrypted sequence s′∗ its hash
will be ∇(s∗).
The digest depends on the complete history of the document
from its initial state. Moreover, each step of this history is
encrypted with the private key of the peer having done the last
action. Note that encrypting each tuple of the history separately
would not be sufficient. Any peer could easily delete any peer-
action pair from the history, and pretend some action did not
exist. In the same way, a peer could substitute any element of
the sequence by any other picked from the same sequence, in
a special form of “replay” attack. Adding the action’s position
number in the digest would not help either, as any suffix of
the sequence could still be deleted by anyone. Moreover, in
this scheme, forging a new digest requires knowledge of other
peers’ private keys.
D. Checking a Digest
In addition to its data, a document should also carry the
encrypted peer-action sequence and a corresponding digest.
Checking that the sequence corresponds to the digest is done
by verifying group membership and the hashes over the entire
sequence.
Definition 2 (Verify Digest): Given an encrypted peer-
action sequence s∗ = (pa∗1, . . . , pa
∗
n) of length n, and a digest d.
Let s′∗ = (pa∗1, . . . , pa
∗
n−1) be the same sequence, trimmed of
its last peer-action pair, and pa∗i = 〈a∗i , pi,gi,hi〉 for i ∈ [0,n].
The sequence s∗ verifies d if and only if ∇−1(s∗,d) where:
∇−1(s∗,d),

M(pn,gn)∧∃〈h,a∗,g〉 : if n > 0
D[d,Ku,pn ] = h¯(h ·a∗ ·g)
∧a∗ = a∗n∧g = gn
∧hn = h¯(h ·a∗ ·g)
∧∇−1(s′∗,h)
> otherwise
Detecting a fraudulent manipulation of the digest or the
peer-action sequence can be done in the following ways:
1) computing D[d,Ku,pn ] produces a nonsensical result, in-
dicating that the private key used to compute that partial
digest is different from the one advertised by the peer-
action sequence (in this case the tuple 〈h,a∗,g〉 cannot be
generated);
2) computing D[d,Ku,pn ] produces a string h ·a∗ ·g such that
the action a∗ and group g extracted from the digest does
not match respectively a∗n and gn, contained in the sequence
for that position
3) observing tampering with the hash hn 6= h¯(h ·a∗ ·g);
4) observing tampering with the groups (g 6= gn) and observ-
ing that pn is not in gn.
We note that even if the action is hidden, it is still possible for
the peer to verify that, at the very least, the peer pn belongs
to gn and knows that pn has taken an action.
E. Decrypting a Sequence
Once a peer validates the authenticity of a sequence, the
peer will then have to decrypt the sequence to process the
actions. The decryption of an encrypted peer-action sequence
will depend on what the peer can see. The new sequence will
depend on the groups the peer belong to.
Definition 3 (Decrypting a Sequence): Given an encrypted
peer-action sequence s∗ = (pa∗1, . . . , pa
∗
n) of length n, and a
peer p ∈ P. Let s′∗ = (pa∗1, . . . , pa∗n−1) be the same sequence,
trimmed of its last peer-action pair, and pa∗i = 〈a∗i , pi,gi,hi〉
for i ∈ [0,n].
SD(s∗, p),

SD(s′∗, p) · pan if M(p,gn)∧n > 0
SD(s′∗, p) if ¬M(p,gn)∧n > 0
ε otherwise
where pan =
〈
D[a∗n,Kgn ], pn,gn,hn
〉
and ε is the empty se-
quence.
In the case where the peer belongs to the group advertised
(M(p,gn)), the last action is decrypted using the group key
(D[a∗n,Kgn ]) and the resulting tuple is included in the decrypted
sequence. Otherwise, when the peer does not belong to the
group (¬M(p,gn)), the entire tuple is discarded from the
sequence.
F. Checking the lifecycle
A peer p verifies the lifecycle of the document based on
his groups. To do so, the peer first computes sp = SD(s∗, p),
then ensures that δp(sp) = >. sp is the sequence that p can
decrypt based on his groups, while δp is the lifecycle p can
verify (defined in Section IV-A).
G. Checking the document
The purpose of the digest is to provide the receiver of a
document a guarantee about the authenticity of the peer-action
sequence that it contains. This sequence, in turn, can be used
to check that the document being passed is genuine and has
not been manipulated.
Given the decrypted peer-action section for p, sp =
SD(s∗, p) = (〈a0, p0,g0,h0〉 , . . . ,〈ak, pk,gk,hk〉). Since the peer-
action sequence can omit some encrypted parts, we have
|sp| ≤ |s∗|. Starting from the base document d /0 it is possible to
Group e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
t X X - - X
t ′ - - X X X
m - - - - X
Table I: Groups and Membership
compute the new document d = fak( fak−1 · · ·( fa1(d /0)) · · ·), and
compare it with the document being passed. In other words,
it is possible for a peer to “replay” the complete sequence of
actions, starting from the empty document, and to compare
the result of this sequence to the actual document. Since some
actions are hidden from the peer, it is not possible to reconstruct
the entire document unless p is in all groups (in which case
sp = s). However it is possible to verify a part of the document
if we consider the following assumptions on the specification:
1) The data in the document is partitioned into pair-wise
disjoint sets D =
⋃
g∈G(Dg).
2) For each action a appearing in a lifecycle δg, fa either
modifies data in Dg or no data at all (does not modify the
document).
With these assumptions, people in the group can “replay” only
the data relevant to the group, since group actions do not
interfere with it. Actions associated with functions that do not
modify the document could be used to synchronize the various
groups. One could consider that each set of fields is encrypted
with the group key, so as to not be visible for other groups.
Note that in some cases, knowledge of the peer-action
sequence and of the empty document is sufficient to reconstruct
the complete document without the need to pass it along. In
such cases, only exchanging the sequence and the digest is
necessary. However, there exist situations where this does not
apply —for example, when the document is a physical object
that has to be passed from one peer to the next (as in the case
of a metro card), or when the data subject to modification is a
subset of all data carried in the document.
H. Full Example
We consider a company consisting of two teams t and
t ′ with two employees in each, respectively e1,e2 and e3,e4.
Additionally we consider the manager e5 belonging to the group
m. Our document is a form which requires voting on a project,
the project requires at least one person per team and both teams
to vote yes to pass. The groups are the summarized in Table I.
We partition the document into three sets S = St ∪
St ′ ∪ Sm with St = { f1, f2}, St ′ = { f3, f4} and Sm = { f5}.
And define the following actions: A = {yi,ni | i ∈ [1,4]} ∪
{com,send, f orward} Such that yi (ni) is associated with the
function that writes yes (resp. no) into field fi for an employee
ei. send specifies an action to send the result to the manager.
The manager then processes it by adding comments in f5 using
the action com, and forwards it to the other group with the
action f orward.
We begin by defining the specification. We use the
predicate vote(s,y,y′) to abstract the voting procedure of
two members. The vote succeeds if either y or y′ appear
only once in the sequence prior to send. Given a sequence
s = (〈a0, p0,g0,h0〉 , . . . ,〈an, pn,gn.hn〉), we define:
Peer sp δp
e1,e2 (y1,n2,send) δt
e3,e4 ( f orward,y3,y4) δt′
e5 (y1,n2,send,com, f orward,y3,y4) δt ∧δt′ ∧δm
Table II: Decryption and Checking
after(s,y,x) ≡ ∀i ∈ [0,n] : (ai = y)→∃ j < i : a j = x
vote(s,y,y′) ≡ ∀i ∈ [0,n] :
(ai = send)→ (∃ j < i : a j ∈
{
y,y′
}
)
∧(ai = y)→ (6 ∃ j 6= i : a j = y)
∧(ai = y′)→ (6 ∃k 6= i : ak = y′)
δt(s) ≡

> if vote(s,y1,y2)
∧(after(s,send,y2)∨ after(s,send,y1))
⊥ otherwise
δt ′(s) ≡

> if vote(s,y3,y4)∧ after(s,y3, f orward)
∧after(s,y4, f orward)
⊥ otherwise
δm(s) ≡
{> if after(s,com,send)∧ after(s, f orward,com)
⊥ otherwise
In this example scenario, employee e1 votes yes
wile employee e2 votes no the sequence is now: s∗ =
(〈E[y1,St ],e1, t,h1〉 ,〈E[n2,St ],e2, t,h2〉). Employee e1 then
sends the form to the manager s adding: 〈E[send,St ],e1, t,h3〉
The manager comments, then signs it but on behalf of
the manager group: 〈E[com,Sm],e5,m,h4〉 The manager
forwards it to the second team on behalf of the sec-
ond team: 〈E[ f orward,St ′ ],e5, t ′,h5〉. The second team then
votes with both accepting the sequence is then appended:
(〈E[y3,St ′ ],e3, t ′,h6〉, 〈E[y4,St ′ ],e4, t ′,h7〉). We show the de-
crypted peer-action sequence for each peer in Table II (for
brevity we display only the actions).
In this case, the fields for each group are separate, each
group can replay their own event and check if the document
matches them. The only person in this case capable of verifying
the entire document is e5 as they are in all groups. The groups
serve to hide the actions of specific individuals. In this case
the teams cannot know which individual voted a “no” from
the other team, even-though they know that they voted. Voting
in this case is unanimous. It is also possible to encrypt the
specification itself, that is each lifecycle δg can be encrypted
with the key of the group Sg. Thus it is possible to hide
specification from the non-group members.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCUSSION
To illustrate the concepts introduced in this paper, we
applied them to the specific scenario where an artifact is a
dynamic, fillable PDF form. In this context, the various fields
of the form constitute the document’s data, which can be filled
and modified by various peers. A special, hidden form field
is included to the document, which is intended to contain the
peer-action sequence reflecting the document’s modification
history.2
We implemented Artichoke, a command-line front-end to
inject and manage peer-action sequences into these forms.
Artichoke uses LATEX to generate forms with various input
and an empty peer-action sequence. It also uses pdftk3 to
extract and manipulate form data in the background. Although
Artichoke is intended as a proof-of-concept implementation
with minimal user-friendliness, it is fully functional and its
source code is public available under the GNU GPL.4 The
current implementation supports a slightly simplified version of
peer-action sequences, where a single group exists, but peers in
the group each have their own public/private key pair to stamp
their actions.
A. Usage
Currently, Artichoke supports the three main operations
on a document, namely filling, examining and checking the
peer-action sequence of a form.
A first operation is to fill a form, which consists in writing
(or overwriting) one or more form fields with specified values.
In our context, filling a form also involves updating the
peer-action sequence contained in that form to include the
modification action and peer information related to that action.
A second operation is to examine the contents of a form;
This will print the current value of all the form’s fields, and
display a summary of the peer-action sequence contained in
the document, which will look like this:
Form fields
-----------
F1: baz
F2: bar
Peer-action sequence
--------------------
Alice W|F1|foo Rm/MRSzK...oYpROg0=
Bob W|F2|bar kEvrkC+e...bX4NO1w=
Carl W|F1|baz F3UYg+n1.../YPs3/k=
The peer-action sequence shows that Alice first wrote “foo”
to field F1, then Bob wrote "bar" to field F2, then Carl overwrote
F1 with “baz”. The rightmost column is a shortened version
of the digest string for each event.
The last operation that can be done with Artichoke is
to validate the contents and history of a form. The policy
is currently specified through user-defined PHP code, by
implementing a special function called check_policy that
receives as its input the peer-action sequence of the current
document. Hence the enforcement of a policy is not tied to any
particular specification language, provided it can be expressed
in terms of the contents of peer-action sequence only.
2Note that this field is only made invisible for the sake of readability; its
hidden nature has nothing to do with protecting it from tampering.
3http://pdftk.org
4https://github.com/liflab/artichoke
B. Resource Consumption
Equipped with this implementation, we proceeded to
perform tests intended to measure the computational resources
required in a typical use-case scenario. In particular, we want
to determine whether the repeated application of encryption
and hashing induces a reasonable cost, in terms of both time
and space, as the history of a document lengthens over time.
The tests were implemented using the ParkBench testing
framework.5 We first generated an empty PDF form with a
single input field F . Using the commands described above, the
test script was then instructed to repeatedly overwrite F with
a dummy value on behalf of some peer. This had for effect of
creating a set of PDF files containing a peer-action sequence
of increasing length.
The first factor we measured is the running time for
appending a new action to an existing document. This is shown
in Figure 4a. One can see that the running time increases
linearly with the number of write operations. We can deduce
from this graph that it takes approximately one second to
perform a single write operation. Note that in this proof-of-
concept implementation, this is done through a chain of calls
to command-line software; in particular, each write operation
requires calling pdftk a first time to dump the file’s data fields,
processing these fields, and calling pdftk a second time to create
a new PDF file with updated data fields. Better performance
could be easily achieved by directly implementing all these
operations in a single program, rather than relying on costly
external calls.
The second factor we measured is the time required to
simply check an existing document without modifying it; this is
shown in Figure 4b. It takes between 200 and 700 ms to check
an entire peer-action sequence; repeated experiments could
not highlight any trend in the running time as the sequence
lengthens. Nevertheless, this seems to indicate that read/decrypt
operations are much quicker to perform than write/encrypt ones.
The final factor we measured is the size of the document
for increasing lengths of a peer-action sequence; this is shown
in Figure 4c. As expected, the size of the sequence grows
linearly with the number of operations applied to the document,
indicating that each element of the sequence requires constant
space. In the current implementation of Artichoke, this space
amounts to roughly 40 bytes.
C. Discussion
Overall, the positive results obtained with the current
implementation of Artichoke illustrate the potential of peer-
action sequences to effectively encode a document’s history so
that lifecycle constraints can be verified on it at any moment.
We mention in the following a few discussion points regarding
the current system.
1) Stateful vs. stateless peers: As such, the peers in the
exchange can be completely stateless: they are not required
to persist any information between accesses to a document,
apart from their public/private key pair.6 All the history and the
5https://sylvainhalle.github.io/ParkBench
6They must also remember the lifecycle function being enforced; however
this could even be saved within the document and encrypted with their private
key. In any case the function is likely to be the same for all documents, and
could in some cases be hard-coded into the peers’ read-only memory.
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Figure 4: Running time of Artichoke on PDF documents with
a peer-action sequence of increasing length: (a) to write the to
document; (b) to check a document; (c) File size of the PDF
document with a peer-action sequence of increasing length.
verification of the lifecycle can be reconstructed from the empty
document at any time. However, a stateful peer can save on
processing time: for each document, such a peer can save the
digest and state of the document each time it receives it. Upon
receiving it another time, it only requires to invert the digest
and check the document’s contents up to its last locally-saved
state. (This is possible, since the probability for a tampered
document to yield the same n-th digest as the original is very
small.) This way, each element of the peer-action sequence
requires processing only once.
2) Space requirements: In addition to the document’s
contents, storage space is required to hold the peer-action
sequence, whose size is proportional to the length of the history.
Note that in the general setting, this sequence cannot simply
be trimmed of its first events after “long enough”, as a peer
could use this facility to cover up a fraudulent manipulation of
the document. The question remains open whether peers can
be given any freedom in erasing prefixes of the history without
the possibility of misuse.
3) Enforcement: In the proposed system, the enforcement
of lifecycle constraints is indirect. Any peer can tamper with
the contents of the document, with its history, or perform
modifications that violate the lifecycle requirements. Likewise,
any peer can choose to accept such a tampered document,
modify it and pass it on to other peers. However, our approach
makes sure that anyone with knowledge of the peers’ public
keys (including peers external to the exchange) can check at
any time whether such misuses occurred, as well as pinpoint
what peers have been faulty or complacent.
4) Duplication: In some situations, the document can be
duplicated. Therefore, a peer can receive a document, modify it
in two different ways, and pass it on to two different peers. Our
proposed approach will still ensure that each copy will follow
a compliant lifecycle, but the uniqueness of each document
cannot be ensured. However, since our approach allows the
specification of a lifecycle for a document, conditions can be
added to this lifecycle so that uniqueness is guaranteed. One
simple (and relatively restrictive) condition could be that at
any point, the possible sender for the next action is always
unique (and would henceforth detect if the same document is
sent twice). Determining conditions for uniqueness is outside
the scope of this work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown how the lifecycle of an artifact
can be effectively stored within the document itself, using the
concept of peer-action sequences. Moreover, this sequence can
be protected from tampering through an appropriate use of
public-key encryption and hashing. This provides at the same
time a mechanism for enforcing different read-write access
permissions to various parts of the document, depending on
the group a peer belongs to. Experiments have shown that
manipulating these sequences does not impose an undue burden
in terms of computing resources, and that the space required
to store a sequence within a document increases linearly with
the number of modifications made to it.
The main advantage of peer-action sequences, over existing
lifecycle compliance approaches, is the fact that compliance can
be checked on-the-fly and at any moment on a document that
can be freely exchanged between peers. Peers do not need to
be statically verified prior to any interaction, and the document
is not required to be accessed from a single point in order
to enforce compliance. This presents the potential of greatly
simplifying the implementation of artifact-centric workflows,
by dropping many assumptions that must be fulfilled by current
systems. Taken to its extreme, lifecycle policies can even be
verified without resorting to any workflow management system
at all: as long as documents are properly stamped by everybody,
the precise way they are exchanged (e-mail, file copying, etc.)
is irrelevant.
Technically speaking, the next step of this work will be to
port Artichoke so that it stores its peer-action sequences into
a data field compliant with the Extensible metadata platform
(XMP) standard [1]. This will allow peer-action sequences to
be stored not only in PDF documents, but also in any media
type that supports XMP: JPEG images, MP3 files, HTML
documents, etc. One could hence imagine lifecycle policies
for types of documents not traditionally considered by the
business process community —such as restrictions on the way
image files can be manipulated. In the case of forms, the filling,
stamping and compliance checking of PDF files with respect
to a peer-action sequence could be implemented directly into
the graphical user interface of a PDF reader, and become a
seamless process that could be executed by a user in a single
button click.
On the formal side, a number of possible extensions and
open questions also arise. For example, can we replace the
current history by some token whose size over time remains
bounded by a constant? Similarly, could we enforce proper
usage by rendering the document unreadable if improperly
modified? This way a peer would not even need to replay
the history: simply trying to read the document would reveal
a problem. The enforcement of constraints across multiple
documents in the same lifecycle is also an open issue; the
use of synchronization signals between peers, borrowed from
decentralized runtime monitoring, could prove a promising
solution. Finally, the question of uniqueness of documents also
needs to be studied. In its current incarnation, the proposed
system allow artifacts to be duplicated, yet enforces that all
copies must follow a valid lifecycle.
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